contract.
OTC derivative contracts historically were treated differently. These are contracts that are usually a bilateral contract between two counterparties. These contracts are generally, but not always, governed by standardized contract language developed by the International Swaps and Securities Association (ISDA). All of the relevant AIG-related contracts that are the subject of this paper were executed using the ISDA Master Agreement. One aspect of that agreement is the Collateral Annex, which can trigger collateral requirements. AIG received collateral requests from counterparties totaling many billions of dollars during 2008 from some but not all of its counterparties. Unlike futures margin, which is collected at the time of a transaction, collateral called under the annex is on an ex-post basis after the value of the contract changes. Thus, at any point in time, the collateral a counterparty has received after making a call, will at best be sufficient to cover losses in the event of a default. In most cases, collateral would be insufficient to make the nondefaulting counterparty whole due to changes in the valuation that occur after the call is made and even after a default. In this paper, we will usually refer to assets posted pursuant to third-party clearing as margin and assets posted pursuant to a bilateral contract as collateral.
The Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing regulations will substantially change this historical practice by requiring clearing by a clearinghouse for some OTC contracts and imposing margin requirements. The CFTC [2011] has conducted rulemaking and set margins for OTC contracts at an increased level compared to comparable futures contracts. We show the proscribed increased margin level is not supported by the type of analysis we present in this paper.
It is possible to extend the use of risk-based margin used for standardized products into the OTC contract markets. This will necessarily require a third-party to be the guarantor to both sides of the contract. The necessity arises from the need to reserve margin for both daily changes in the mark-to-market valuation of the contract and also for the potential future changes in value. Thus, at any point in time the guarantor would hold margin from both counterparties. This feature of riskbased margin provides an important bulwark against propagation of systemic risk. Although at first it may seem less capital efficient to require additional margin for an OTC transaction, in fact, it merely shifts the burden of financing credit risk from a firm's counterparties to a potentially defaulting firm. By making margin highly sensitive to measurable financial risk, risk-based margin encourages firms to reduce their own default potential through financial risk reduction measures such as hedging. AIGFP, for example, failed to materially hedge the portion of its OTC portfolio related most directly responsible for the losses at the center of AIG's financial distress.
Margin requirements can be computed using a form of value at risk (VaR). VaR is described by Jorion [2000] , Duffie [1997] , and Anderson, et al [2009] . Value at risk is a well understood procedure, which has both advocates and critics. The computation of VaR is based on the price variation of the contracts over some historical period. The price variation data permits a calculation of the anticipated potential change in value over a given time horizon at some probability level. A common level of risk is frequently taken to be a 99th %-tile change in value over a ten-day period, but other points can be chosen based on the characteristics of the contract and market. VaR can be extended to a portfolio of contracts and the price variability is then expanded to the covariance of prices, which allows margin to be sized with the correlation of the contracts in mind, offering a credit for hedged positions. VaR can be calculated using historical data alone, analytic summary functions calibrated to the data, simulation techniques, or combinations of those three methods.
Criticism of VaR is widespread and Taleb [1997] is an excellent presentation. Generally, the criticism is focused on the nature of VaR as a backward looking price analysis rather than a forward looking analysis. While many criticisms of VaR have merit, we reject such criticisms for margin applications for three reasons. First, the purpose of margin is to enable a liquidation of portfolios over the short period of liquidation following default. Second, VaR is clearly not a sufficient statistic for measuring strategic risk. Incorporating subjective assessments into margin computations would inject artificial unpredictability into the process. Third, criticism of VaR often applies when it is used inappropriately as a surrogate measure for risks it does not measure. Embrechts et al [2000] also point out that VaR is it not a subadditive risk measure. Subadditivity is a property of risk measures such that the risk measure of a portfolio is the sum of the risk measures of its components. Since VaR is not subadditive, it is possible that the VaR of a portfolio is larger than the sum of VaRs for the components of the portfolio. However, Danielson et al [2005] show that, when the region of interest is the lower tail of the return distribution, under very general conditions, VaR is subadditive.
Offsetting the criticism are substantial benefits. First, VaR provides a well-understood and replicable framework for evaluating liquidation risks following default. This reliability allows a reproducible third-party framework to underlie the margin calculation procedure, which is currently lacking in the OTC contract markets. Second, VaR changes dynamically to adjust to changing market dynamics. Volatility varies over time and thus risk-based margin would rise and fall correspondingly. Third, portfolio VaR would raise or fall as correlations among the portfolio of contracts change over time. This feature of dynamic correlations enables the proceedure to capture the margin implications of periodic liquidity crises during which historical correlations are frequently observed to change, and thus influence potential losses given default.
Overview of financial contracts leading to AIG's losses
The FCIC [2011] makes it clear that an important aspect of AIG's financial collapse lay in its failure to understand, quantify and hedge the risks it took on when selling credit default swaps (CDS) on securities called collateralized debt obligations (CDO) . In this section we will briefly review the characteristics of these financial contracts to emphasize their complexity and bespoke nature. We follow the terminology adopted in Duffie and Singleton [2003] , Hyder [2002] , Flanagan et al [2001] and Mahadevan, et al [2005] . In principle, a CDO can be viewed as merely a loan pool managed to meet investors' preferences for income and capital appreciation. Similarly, a CDS can be viewed as merely a periodic payment to transfer default risk. However, that simplicity belies their complexity from structural, valuation and risk management perspectives.
Collateralized Debt Obligations
A CDO is an asset-backed security in which fixed income financial assets are purchased by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) that has no other assets other than its initial capital. The SPV's assets may be corporate bonds, mortgages, or other securities that usually but need not pay a fixed periodic coupon.
2 The SPV issues one or more securities, also called tranches that specify coupon rates, priority of payment, and contingent rights to the loan pool assets. There are more than a In a typical CDO, purchasers of the SPV's issued securities have only the SPV assets as collateral in the event of default of an issued security. In a typical CDO, the issued securities are ordered according to seniority. The most senior tranche pays a lower periodic coupon but is partially protected from loan defaults by other tranches that bear losses first. Each tranche is characterized also by attachment and detachment points. These points are usually expressed as percentages of the total loan principal losses that will be applied when the underlying loan assets default. If an underlying loan defaults, then those losses would be applied in order from least to most senior tranche beginning at the attachment percentage and ending at the detachment percentage. A tranche called the super senior tranche is frequently employed to represent the most senior security. Super senior tranches are the principle subject of AIGs financial collapse. Securities with intermediate levels of risk are frequently called mezzanine tranches. Additional modifications to the risk profile for each tranche can be employed in which some of the cash flows are retained or guaranteed in a procedure known as overcollateralization. There are dozens of specific techniques used to provide overcollateralization. These can be challenging to model analytically and AIG's 10k for 2007 revealed material weaknesses in their derivative valuation as a result.
An SPV raises capital by selling the securities it issues, usually via a marketing contract with an investment bank, and purchases the SPV's loan pool assets with a portion of the proceeds. The selling price of each issued tranche depends on its coupon and its exposure to default losses, when compared to similar securities. Cash flows from the loan pool assets are contractually prioritized, with separate rules governing for administrative costs, periodic payments from the loan pool assets, repayments of principal from the loan pool assets, and recoveries from assets in default. These cash flow rules are collectively referred to as the waterfall.
Valuing a CDO requires both a theoretical model of the security and data to calibrate the model. The challenges arise mostly due to poor data, which often motivates theoretical and modeling approximations. Since, a CDO is composed of discrete debt obligations, it is theoretically possible to enumerate all possible combinations of default of the loan pool assets and to use the same arithmetic as for valuing cash flows from a bond for each such combination applying the coupon rate to discount coupon payments or default obligations. In this spirit, Manzano et al [2011] describe the application of the Monte Carlo procedure which can be repeated thousands of times to produce a comprehensive range of scenarios. Their analysis operated at the most granular level with each mortgage pool specifically modeled and hypothetical default scenarios traced through the cash flow waterfall. Mortgage-foreclosure data is imperfect as a forward-looking risk measure even though databases covering every mortgage are maintained. And other valuation challenges exist. The correlation among geographic regions, the correlation between CDOs issued in different years, and the potential effect on CDO prices of negative home appreciation are all key issues for which good data was lacking. The default rate on mortgages is strongly influenced by the vintage, or year of issue.
The extreme level of complexity embedded within CDOs led to a search for parsimonious models with relatively few parameters representing default rates and volatility of default rates to be calibrated to observed market quotes for credit-sensitive securities. It was this search that led to the introduction of parsimonious models for CDO valuation, whose parameters could then be used to value other CDOs with similar properties. Goodman et al [2008] describe indexes such as the ABX.HE series by Markit that were developed to be used for market pricing purposes. Thus, valuations for CDOs used by the majority of the market came to be estimated from indexes such as the ABX.HE series by MarkIt. There are several commercial services dedicated to performing these calculations and Burtschell et al [2008] and Schlösser [2011] describe at least six different computational algorithms.
An additional issue affecting CDO valuation lies in the correlation between the prices of different tranches in a CDO. Clearly they are related though the cash flow waterfall. Li [2000] observed that a Gaussian copula would allow use of marginal distributions to create the joint distribution on tranche default. Burtschell et al [2008] describe flaws in that methodology and alternatives. Thus, although the super senior tranches were designed to be protected, they were correlated with the price of less protected tranches in surprising ways.
Credit Default Swaps AIGFP was a protection seller on tranches of CDOs. We follow Duffie and Singleton [2003] , Kakodkar [2006] and O' Kane [2003] in describing these securities. A CDS is a security in which a protection buyer makes a periodic payment to a protection seller and the seller promises to pay a fixed amount in the event of default of a reference entity. In AIGFP's case, they sold protection against the default of super senior tranches of various CDOs. The majority of the loans in those CDOs were subprime mortgages. The value of such a CDS depends on the value of the underlying tranche protected since that is the payoff on default. We can write the value of a CDS as it depends on the present value of the periodic payments (P), the probability of default (p), and the value of the reference CDO given default:
. We can rewrite this to emphasize a common risk factor S: .
In the majority of CDSs written by AIGFP, the probability of default would increase while the value of the obligation would increase in tandem with a common risk factor, i.e. subprime mortgage concentration in the loan pools. Cespedes et al (2010) describe this phenomenon as wrong-way risk and offer an efficient method of estimating its magnitude. Wrong-way risk implies the CDS structure could magnify losses experienced by the underlying loan pool. AIGFP executives expressed the view that was zero for all S. For simplicity, we instead adopt the convention that . With this convention, changes in the value of a CDS would be proportional to changes in the value of the referenced CDO. For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the value at risk for a portfolio of underlying CDOs.
Value at Risk for CDOs
Value at risk is a point on the lower tail of the probability distribution on future value at a specified point in time for a CDO tranche. An MBS has a nonlinear dependence on its key input parameters due to the embedded optionality. This nonlinear dependence can be modeled using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, partial differential equations, or analytic approximations using a Taylor series approximation. These methods are useful for calculating VaR when transaction data for the MBS security of interest is not directly available. Poon, et al [2011] show that there can be substantial differences in calculated VaR among the methods. This should not be too surprising since the methods are theoretical values and not directly observed market values.
In this paper, we will employ the delta-gamma VaR approximation described by Jorion [2006] , which is a variation on the Taylor-series method. Following Jorion, the relative change in the value of a security (V) is estimated from the relative changes in the value of a risk factor (S) using the Taylor-series approximation: Poon, et al [2011] show that for MBSs during the time fame of interest, that the first term in a Taylor series expansion dominates the VaR results for MBSs. This finding supports the intuition that, during the financial crisis, the prepayment option was of secondary importance relative to other risk factors in valuing mortgage-backed securities. Since the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the use of risk-based margin, we will simply use this first-order approximation for VaR without refinement. While the method just described works for multiple risk factors, we further simplify the procedure to a single risk factor and choose that factor to be the Markit ABX.HE index most closely matching the CDOs underlying the AIG CDS contracts. Stanton and Wallace [2008] Following Jorion again and simplifying to the first term to calculate VaR for the ith underlying CDO mapped to the jth ABX.HE index:
where α is the standard deviate for a given confidence-level percentile, c, on the cumulative normal distribution and σ t is the standard deviation of daily returns over the time period, t, of interest. We use the formula even though the underlying price changes do not follow a normal distribution and are not stationary. To compensate for those features and for the illiquidity, we compute VaR using a one-month time period. Markit ABX.HE indexes are tabulated as a percent of par, so percentage changes in S carry over to percentage changes in the underlying CDO that corresponds to the index, implying a delta of one (i.e. delta = = 1).
In order to facilitate replication of our results, we describe the procedure. We first calculate the daily variation in prices for the index. We next calculate the moving average of the standard deviation of the daily price changes over the trailing 22 trading days. We then multiply the moving average by the square root of 22 trading days to obtain a monthly standard deviation. Finally, we multiply by 2.33, which is the normal deviate corresponding to a 99%-tile deviation. Jorion [2006] describes variations on this approach that could be used. We do this for all rating levels and origination dates in the ABX.HE dataset. Exhibit 2 illustrates the result of computing VaR for the AAA and BBB tranches of the ABX.HE AAA.06-1 index. In the exhibit, we display the 99% one-month VaR. Note that VaR reached levels exceeding 30% during the height of the financial crisis during late 2008 and early 2009 even for the AAA rated tranche. This is broadly consistent with data Morgan Stanley [2008] presented to the New York Federal Reserve Board. We can also examine the correlation between the daily price variations for each time series finding that there is very low correlation among most tranches. Exhibit 4 illustrates one of the higher correlation pairs. We choose to drop the diversification terms from the VaR computation in light of this finding. Wide variation in the CDO characteristics occurs for the individual ABX.HE indexes. Stanton and Wallace [2008] examined the statistics of the attachment and detachment points for ABX.HE indexes. They found that the attachment points could vary from 23% to 60% for individual CDOs within a single ABX.HE index for AAA rated securities. It's clear from the wide variation in attachment points within a given rating that the other cash-flow related CDO structuring features play a large role in the rating and therefore also the price. This relationship follows from the substantial effect bespoke CDO design features such as credit default triggers and overcollateralization can have on the CDO tranche waterfall.
One aspect of the rapid deterioration of CDO prices during 2007 was the divergence of pricevariation of CDO tranches compared to bonds with similar credit ratings. Ratings are a measure of expected loss or probability of default over a period of time, such as one year. Some investors, who utilize ratings as a measure of the potential for future changes in future value, found that divergence troubling. Fender et al [2008] provide several illustrative examples. Starting with a corporate bond and a CDO tranche having similar expected loss and probability of default, they demonstrate the dramatically different sensitivities of each security to various scenarios. Credit VaR for the CDO tranche in their example is more than ten times greater than for the corporate bond even though ratings and expected loss are nearly identical. The heightened sensitivity largely stems from the CDO waterfall structure, which can magnify the changes in expected loss over time when the shape of the loss distribution also changes. Thus, commonly used risk-factoring methods cannot be applied to compare CDOs to corporate bonds. This fact was a motivation for our use of the ABX.HE data in contrast to more liquid contracts from other bond markets.
Overview of AIGFP's Portfolio of Super Senior Credit Default Swaps
Although credit default swaps are simple in concept, AIG's portfolio was deeply complex. Virtually every contract specified a unique combination of contractual features. AIG's super senior CDS contract counterparties included more than a dozen of the largest financial institutions covering a notional value exceeding $63 billion with subprime exposure. Although AIG [2007] revealed that its total exposure to the CDS market exceeded $500 billion, we focus on the super senior CDS exposure because that is where the greatest losses occurred. AIGFP's Risk Monitoring Flash Report [2008b] 4 reveals that "CDS on Multi Sector CDO represents less than 1/5 of total synthetic credit exposures, but accounts for almost 100% of the losses. A 1% move in the price of the underlying Multi Sector CDO equates to a $710mm loss."
The Federal Reserve Board New York (FRBNY) maintained in collaboration with AIG a list of the super senior CDS that were included in the transactions that ultimately ended up being acquired by Maiden Lane III. These transactions were initially disclosed to the public in January 2010 when the so-called "Schedule A" to the Forward Purchase Agreements was released by FRBNY [2008b] . We rely on the more detailed listing in FRBNY [2008a] , for each of their super senior CDSs to compute a price that they believed was consistent with the available market data. It is not possible to fully replicate AIGFP's use of the BET model using publically available data. This is because transaction-specific modifications were made by AIGFP to the BET model to capture the cash flow implications of each transaction's unique features. Nonetheless, the dynamic change in risk levels of AIGFP's super senior portfolio occurred due to market price changes for the underlying loan pools not transaction specific features. Therefore, we will consider a reduced portfolio, sometimes called a compressed portfolio, that matches the notional amounts by initial credit rating and align those with the same credit rating for the ABX.HE indexes. This ratings-based equivalence is essentially how AIG [2007] presented its portfolio to investors in late 2007. AIGFP [2008b] also displayed the distribution by notional value of its super senior portfolio across ratings, subordination levels, and vintages. 6 The report for October 9, 2008 summarized the rating distribution as shown in Exhibit 5.
An important influence on pricing and VaR is the year of a security's issuance. Exhibit 1 compared the ABX.HE indexes for the AAA tranche for each of the four series. The deteriorating credit quality of the underlying loan pool is apparent in the dramatic price differences. In AIGFP's super senior portfolio 39% of the notional exposure was 
Exhibit 5 AIGFP Risk Dashboard summary of rating distribution for CDS portfolio on August 31, 2008
Rating level reported by AIGFP 
Computing risk-based margin for AIGFP's Super Senior CDS Portfolio
We turn now to the task of applying a VaR-based margin procedure retrospectively to AIGFP's CDS portfolio in order to create a conjectural scenario and compare the likely financial incentives that might have been created. We described earlier in this paper the transactions in the CDS portfolio and the ABX.HE indexes upon which we compute a VaR for the portfolio.
The AIGFP portfolio included securities that originated in 2003, 2004 and 2005 . Markit was not collecting quotation data for CDOs originated in those years. We therefore construct conjectural indexes based on an extrapolation from AIGFPs internal valuations and the Markit indexes. Before describing that, we will first summarize the AIGFP portfolio in terms of several key statistics.
Exhibit 7 summarizes the total original notional position of AIG's CDS portfolio arranged by date of origination and rating. About 52% of the notional value corresponds to the available ABX.HE price indexes. So, capturing the characteristics of the remaining portion is important.
Exhibit 6 Blackrock estimated loan pool losses as presented to the FRBNY by vintage
Series Blackrock, in its work for the FRBNY, constructed new series it created to mimic the Markit procedure. Instead, we will use AIG's internal valuations to develop conjectural series that are proportionally consistent with each combination of origination date and rating level. Exhibit 8 presents the AIGFP internal pricing arranged by year of origination and rating of the underlying CDO tranche. We also adopt a naming convention similar to that developed by Markit for the series. 
Comparison and conclusions
Finally, we aggregated both the change in mark-to-market value and the VaR-based collateral across all ratings and origination dates. Exhibit 13 illustrates the resulting aggregation. The red squares represent the aggregated collateral calls from all counterparties as they were reported by AIG. We drew the following insights from this calculation:
1. Counterparty collateral calls related to the changes in mark-to-market value were too little and too late compared to independent valuations using the Markit data. Substantial calls were not issued against AIGFP until mid- A summary of the actual and VaR-based margin at key dates is provided in Exhibit 14. Based on Markit's ABX.HE indexes AIGFP had already experienced over $11 billion in mark-to-market losses by September 2007 when it began posting collateral. By that date, a risk-based margin system would have required over $20 billion in margin. Had a risk-based margin procedure been in place, AIG would have faced margin calls in early February 2007 on the order of $7.68 billion, composed of both mark-to-market changes in value and risk-based margin, at a time when its mark-to-market losses were under $3 billion. The actual collateral calls issued by AIG's counterparties did not reach the level of unrealized losses implied by the Markit indexes until September 2008. By then, the implied credit exposure of AIG's counterparties was an additional $18.9 billion measured by the value at risk for additional losses.
A counterfactual analysis would expand on this to examine quantitatively the likely effect of margin procedures on derivative trading decisions of AIG and other market participants. It is possible that changes in trading strategies motivated by the presence of risk-based margin would influence the likely prices of derivatives and other other aspects of derivative markets. That counterfactual analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but we can make some observations about the relative direction of those influences.
One of the defining features of AIG's position was the failure of AIG management and its advisors to act to reduce the buildup of financial risk within the CDS portfolio. Had an external guarantor issued an $8 billion margin call in February 2007, the attention of its Board members would have been riveted on identifying and solving the mismatch of expectations. As happened at firms with effective risk-management programs, a hedging program would have been quickly implemented. And for AIG, that would have occurred while it still had the financial resources to absorb $8 billion in margin calls. Instead, by delaying action for a crucial year, losses accumulated to over $40 billion and collateral calls came due at a time of restricted financial flexibility. Risk-based margin procedures, as we demonstrate in this paper, offer the prospect of creating incentives for early hedging that can reduce the likelihood and mitigate the consequences of future systemic crises. Additionally, the methods described in this paper can provide a reproducible computational procedure that can also assure that margin withheld by a third-party guarantor is sufficient but not 
